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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, AND ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,
Docket No. 920172
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Category 16
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Defendant-Appellant
submits

this brief

Fire

Insurance

Exchange

in reply to the brief

filed

respectfully
on behalf

of

plaintiffs-appellees in the above-entitled matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although defendant acknowledges that this Court reviews the
facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989), several facts contained in
plaintiffs7

brief are either unsupported

recited

a

in

potentially

misleading

in the record or are

fashion.

As

a

result,

defendant submits the following review of the record:
Paragraph 1 of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates "Mr.
Crookston continually worked 2-3 jobs and saved for many years
until 1978 . . .."

The record, on the other hand, reflects that

1

for at least part of the relevant time period, Mr. Crookston was
not as industrious as plaintiffs now claim:
Q.

Was there ever a time that you had only
one job and not two or three?

A.

I think so. There was a period of time
that I may have, yes. I can't remember.

(R. 1999-2000)
Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' statement of facts infers that the
Crookstons paid $12,000 to the Bank in order to keep costs down.
The fact of the matter is that the Bank required the Crookstons in
September, 1981, to pay down the original construction loan in
order to receive an extension on their loan.

(R. 2008-2009)

This

extension was necessitated by delays in the construction of their
unique earth home.

(Id.)

Due to their precarious

financial

condition at the time, plaintiffs had to borrow the bulk of the
$12,000 from Mrs. Crookston's parents.

(R. 2009)

Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates that
ff

[t]he Crookstons performed various services such as painting and

finish work in order to keep costs down.11

The record indicates,

however, that the house collapsed before the painting and finish
work was initiated.

(R. 2019-20, 2160)

In fact, the portion of

the record cited by plaintiffs in their brief indicates that the
only work actually performed by plaintiffs was

(1) helping the

contractor obtain a building permit, and (2) helping direct traffic
around a crane at the construction site.

(R. 2019)

Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates that
plaintiffs believed that Fire Insurance "was not doing anything11 to
2

adjust the loss at the time they requested assistance from attorney
H. Ralph Klemm.

Nevertheless, attorney Klemm testified at trial

that Fire Insurance had in fact already been working with the
original contractor of the earth home, Kyle Brewster, in an attempt
to obtain a repair bid.
Brewster's
Insurance

inability
requested

repair bids.
attorney,

and

(Id.)
the

to

(R. 1686-1687)
promptly

Mr. Klemm's

As a result of Mr.

provide
assistance

a

repair

bid,

in obtaining

Fire
other

Eventually, Fire Insurance, plaintiffs, their
Bank

solicited

bids

on

the

repair

of

the

plaintiffs' unique earth home. Without exception, each experienced
difficulties in obtaining detailed, competent bids (R. 1687-1688,
1976-1977, 2035, 2557)
Paragraph 11 of plaintiffs' statement of facts infers that the
testimony

of Argen Jager

establishes

that very

little

of

the

remains of the earth home were salvageable, by stating, "He had to
completely tear out the interior due to the extensive damage and
was able to salvage very little . . .."

Mr. Jager testified that

he had to remove the interior of the earth home because he entirely
changed the design of the house and constructed a conventional home
in its place.

(R. 2667-2668)

Paragraph 25(f) of plaintiffs' statement of facts indicates
that Fire Insurance's adjuster "had the audacity to expressly state
that he felt good about what he did to the Crookstons!"
reveals that such a statement was never made at trial:
Q.

How long did it take
deposition taken, sir?

3

to

have

your

The record

A.

As I recall, I was there on two different
days, the better part of two days.

Q.

Were you nervous?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you nervous right now?

A.

Yes.
* * *

Q.

(By Mr. Roybal)
lot of times?

Have you been nervous a

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you lost sleep over this?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

At any time, to anyone, have you ever
lied?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever not told the truth?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did you feel good about what you did?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you have concerns all along about the
Crookstons?

A.

Yes. Our main concern is always for our
policyholder.

(R. 2285-2286)
The adjuster's testimony when viewed in the context of the
line of questioning posed at trial clearly does not state that "he
felt good about what he did to the Crookstons," as claimed by
plaintiffs.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ordinarily
retroactively*

overruling

decisions

are

to

be

applied

This Court in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,

817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), articulated a standard for defining the
"reasonable and rational relationship" requirement between punitive
and compensatory awards.

On remand, Fire Insurance requested that

it be permitted a new jury trial utilizing the Crookston standards.
The trial court refused.

The trial court's refusal was in error

and constituted an abuse of discretion.
The punitive award in this case represents the most flagrant
deviation from the historical pattern of punitive damage awards in
the history of this state.

The deviation is significant both in

terms of the sheer size of the award and the ratio the $4.0 million
punitive award bears to the compensatory damages, especially the
"hard" actual damages, in this case.

Such a gross deviation from

the historical pattern requires a finding that the award was the
result of passion and prejudice.
The trial court erred in considering and adopting in its order
facts and unreasonable inferences wholly outside the record.

The

court's reliance on such facts constitutes a separate ground for
reversal of the denial of defendant's motion for new trial or
remittitur.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
FIRE INSURANCE SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETRY
THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO A NEW JURY.
Plaintiffs assert that a new trial by jury on the amount of
punitive damages is unwarranted because the pre-Crookston standards
for awarding punitive damages were constitutionally

sound, the

Crookston presumptive ratio standard is to be used solely by trial
judges,

the

plaintiffs

and

the

inconvenienced by such a retrial.

judicial

system

would

be

Fire Insurance, on the other

hand, maintains that the trial court abused

its discretion in

refusing Fire Insurance a new trial on the amount of punitive
damages.
The punitive damage award in this case is unparalleled in the
history of the judicial system of the state of Utah.
acknowledged

that

the

shocking

award

of

This Court

$4.0 million

clearly

exceeded the general pattern of punitive damage awards made in this
state since statehood.
award

of punitive

In the nearly 100 years since statehood, no

damages

excessive as this one.

has

so

clearly

stood

out

as

being

In fact, the amount of the award, without

consideration for accrued post-judgment interest while on appeal,
is eight times greater than the next highest affirmed verdict.

See

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).
The jury's award of $4.0 million was the direct result of
defendant's

mistaken

claims handling

and

standard for awarding punitive damages.

6

a deficient

judicial

This Court in Crookston

noted repeatedly

the deficiencies

in the traditional

"list of

factors11 standard used by the jury in setting the punitive damage
award

in this case.

defendant's assorted
damage

award,

the

Although this Court refused
constitutional

Court

did

to pass on

challenges to the punitive

acknowledge

the

need

for

a

new

approach, a new standard, to provide greater direction to juries in
making punitive awards and to judges in reviewing the propensity of
a jury award.

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808.

The issue of whether defendant is entitled to a new jury trial
boils down

to basic

fairness under

the

law.

Fire

Insurance

maintains that it is patently unfair for one trier of fact to set
the initial award of punitive damages under one standard and then
to permit a reviewing court to pass upon the propriety of the award
with another judicial standard.

The original jury verdict was

rendered by a jury that was given very little guidance on the
"reasonable and rational relationship" requirement that must exist
between an award of punitive damages and the actual damages in a
case.

On the other hand, Judge Frederick was specifically directed

to take into account the need for such a reasonable and rational
relationship between the punitive and compensatory damages.
impossible

to speculate with

any degree

It is

of accuracy what

the

original jury would have done if it had been instructed under the
guidelines set forth in the Crookston opinion.
While the pre-Crookston "list of factors" standard may have

met constitutional muster against a federal due process challenge,
this Court's action in remanding the case to the trial court for
7

further consideration in light of Crookston creates significant
constitutional concerns.

If this Court and the trial court review

the excessiveness of the punitive damage award under the Crookston
standards,

the

parties

will

be

effectively

denied

procedural

fairness, due process, and the right to trial by jury.
Plaintiffs' contention that a jury is ill-equipped to apply
the

Crookston

presumptive

unsupportable.

The

requirement defined

ratio

reasonable

standard
and

is

ill-founded

rational

and

relationship

in Crookston would help insure that juries

carefully deliberate before awarding punitive damages in excess of
the suggested ratios.

If a jury knows the presumptive ratio ahead

of time and then chooses to make an award in excess of the ratio,
the award would

strongly suggest that the jury considered

matter an unusual case worthy of such a deviation.

the

Furthermore, a

jury should be instructed as to the significance of the distinction
between "hard11 and "soft11 type compensatory damages and take that
distinction into account when fixing a punitive damage award.

On

remand, defendant suggested such jury instructions to the trial
court.

(R. 3189-90)

It can scarcely be said that jurors who are

competent to distinguish between general and special damages or
hard and soft damages in affixing compensatory awards are somehow
ill-equipped to make such distinctions when making punitive damage
awards.
Plaintiffs assert that it would be unfair to now, some eleven
years after the collapse of their home, to require them to retry
the amount of punitive damages.
8

Plaintiffs assert that court

dockets would be adversely affected
retried.

if this matter were to be

The issue is not whether plaintiffs will be somehow

disadvantaged by being required to retry this case.

Plaintiffs

cannot dispute that upon payment of the compensatory award, they
were made whole.

Since plaintiffs already have been made whole,

this issue is simply whether plaintiffs intend to prosecute this
matter further in order to promote the public policy concerns of
punishment and deterrence.

Clearly, even if this case is remanded

for a new trial, no one is forcing plaintiffs to proceed further
against their will.

Since they have been made whole, any further

prosecution of this matter would be presumably merely

for the

betterment of society, rather than for the benefit of plaintiffs7
financial standing.

The impact of any retrial of the issue of

punitive damages would be minimal at best on plaintiffs and the
resources of the judicial system of the state of Utah.
This Court in Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Board,
657

P.2d

257,

264

(Utah

1982),

acknowledged

that

overruling

decisions should ordinarily be applied retroactively.

Plaintiffs

pose various arguments against the application of the Crookston
standards to the very case which gave rise to these new standards.
While state and federal constitutions do not apparently require a
new trial by jury utilizing the Crookston standards, notions of
fair play and justice suggest strongly such a result.

Under such

circumstances, the trial court should have permitted a new jury to
pass on the issue of punitive damages.

9

In failing to permit a new

trial by jury under the Crookston standards, the trial court abused
its discretion.
POINT II,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO REMIT THE UNPRECEDENTED AWARD OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE.
The punitive award in this case represents the most flagrant
deviation from the historical pattern of punitive damages awards in
the history of the state of Utah.

The deviation is significant

both in terms of the sheer size of the award and the ratio the
punitive award bears to the compensatory damages in the case.
A.

Sheer Size of the Punitive Damage Award Required a Remittitur
On June 11, 1987, judgment was entered against Fire Insurance

in the amount of $4 million in punitive damages.

The jury's award

is eight times greater than the next highest award ever affirmed by
this

Court

in Von

Hake

v.

Thomas, 705

P. 2d

766

(Utah

1985)

($500,000 punitive award affirmed), and 20 times greater than the
second highest affirmed award in Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching,
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) ($200,000 punitive award affirmed).
In Crookston, this Court noted that the punitive award in this
case "is far greater than the awards reduced in many prior cases"
and "exceeds the bounds of the general pattern set by . . . prior
decisions."

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 801, 807 (emphasis added).

It

is well established that punitive damages are a harsh remedy and
not normally favored in law. Alveska Pipeline Service Co., Inc. v.
Beadles, 731 P.2d 572 (Alaska 1987); Rosener v. Sears Roebuck and
Co. , 110 Cal.3d

740, 168 Cal.Rptr. 237
10

(1980); Sere v.

Group

Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33 (D.C. Ct.App. 1982); Cheney v.
Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983);
Tucker v. Illinois Power Co., 232 Ill.App.3d 15, 597 N.E.2d 220
(1992); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454 (Miss.
1983); Home Ins. Co. v. American Home Products Corp., 75 N.Y.2d
196, 551 N.Y.Supp.2d 481, 550 N.E.2d 930 (1990); Becker v. Pearson,
241 Or. 215, 405 P.2d 534 (1965).

Since punitive awards are not

favored, this Court has correctly observed that large punitive
awards should be scrutinized closely.
The

trial

court

in

this

case

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 810.
has

now

been

given

two

opportunities to either order a new trial on the issue of punitive
damages or to reduce the unprecedented punitive damage award.
trial

court

defendant.

has

twice

Although

refused
the

to

trial

grant

court

any

must

be

such

relief

accorded

The
to
some

discretion on ruling on the excessiveness of a punitive damage
award because of the court's advantaged position during trial, less
discretion should be accorded to the trial court on the review of
a punitive damage award.

See Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 62, 2 67

P.2d 759, 766 (1954).
In this case, this Court is now faced squarely with a punitive
damage award 800% greater than any other award ever affirmed by
this Court. Plaintiffs contend that such an unprecedented award is
required due to the nature of defendant's conduct and the size and
nature

of

defendant's

business.

Such

factors

are

wholly

insufficient to sustain the staggering award of punitive damages in
this case.

Historical patterns developed in punitive damage cases
11

in this state over nearly 100 years, and more especially in the
modern era, clearly demonstrate that the jury's verdict in this
case and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial or remit
the damage award, were unsupportable.

Prior deviations from the

historical patterns by themselves have in the past been sufficient
for this Court to conclude that the awards were the result of
passion and prejudice.

Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 810.

Under such

circumstances, this Court has been required to step in and reduce
the awards directly or to order a new trial.

This Court should,

therefore, order either a remittitur or a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages in this case.
B.

The Lack of a Reasonable and Rational Relationship
In addition to the unprecedented size of the punitive award in

this case, the ratio between punitive damages and the compensatory
damages awarded by the jury in this case is unsupportable and
demands that this Court remit the punitive damage award or grant
defendant a new trial.

This Court in Crookston identifies more

than 2 0 reported punitive damage cases in the state of Utah which
have produced "fairly predictable results" on the required ratio
that

should

damages.
damages

exist

between

punitive

damages

Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 809, 810.
must

generally

bear

a

and

compensatory

By law, punitive

"reasonable

and

relationship" to the actual damages awarded at trial.
reviewing

the

"language

and

pattern

of

results"

rational
Id.

from

In
prior

decisions of this Court, this Court found the following presumptive
ratios exist:
12

The general rule to be drawn from our past
cases appears to be that where the punitives
are well below $100,000, punitive damage
awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages
have seldom been upheld and that where the
award is in excess of $100,000, we have
indicated some inclination to overturn awards
having ratios of less than 3 to 1.
Id, (emphasis added).
The following chart identifies the specific action taken by
this Court in the punitive damage cases identified in footnote 2 4
of the Crookston opinion:

Case

Jury Award
(p.d. = punitive
damages,
comp. = compensatory
damages)

Ratio Punitive
Damages to
Compensatory
Damages

Appellate
Action Taken
on Punitive
Damage Award

Von Hake v.
Thomas

$500,000 p.d.
$487,000 comp.

1.03 to 1

Affirmed

Jensen v.
Pioneer Dodge

$100,000 p.d.
$1,234.50 + $50/
day comp.1

81 to 1

Reversed and
remanded

Synergetics
v. Marathon

$200,000 p.d.
$452,000 comp.

Bundy v.
Century
Equipment

44 to 1

Affirmed

$75,000 p.d. (trial
court remitted to
$25,000), $2,133 comp.

11.7 to 1

Remanded

Nelson v.
Jacobsen

$25,000 p.d.
$59,600 comp.

.42 to 1

Reversed and
Remanded

Cruz v.
Montoya

$12,000 p.d.
$9,579.89 comp.

1.25 to 1

Reduced
punitive award
to $6,000

Branch v.
Western
Petroleum

$13,000 p.d.
$18,750 comp.

.69 to 1

Affirmed

Leigh
Furniture
v. Isom

$35,000 p.d. (trial
court remitted to
$13,000) $65,000
comp.

.54 to 1

Reinstated
jury award

Per diem damages would have exceeded $70,000 at time of opinion,
result, ratio was likely 1.4 to 1.

13

As a

Case

Jury Award
(p.d. = punitive
damages,
comp. = compensatory
damages)

Ratio Punitive
Damages to
Compensatory
Damages

Appellate
Action Taken
on Punitive
Damage Award

First
Security Bank
v. JBJ
Feedyards

$100,000 p.d.
$36,564.60 comp.

2.7 to 1

Reduced award
to $50,000

Clayton v.
Crossroads
Equip. Co.

$20,000 p.d.
$27,500 comp.

.73 to 1

Affirmed

Elkington
v. Foust

$30,000 p.d.
$12,000 comp.

2.5 to 1

Affirmed

Terry v.
ZCMI

$15,000 p.d. (trial
court remitted to
$2,000), $6,500 comp.

2.3 to 1

Reinstated
jury award

Kesler v.
Rogers

$10,000 p.d.
$25,403.17 comp.

.39 to 1

Reduced award
to $5,000

Prince v.
Peterson

$3,000 p.d.
$5,537 comp.

.54 to 1

Reduced award
to $5,000

Holdaway
v. Hall

$5,000 p.d.
$10,683.50 comp.

.47 to 1

Affirmed

Powers v.
Taylor

$2,500 p.d. (trial
court remitted to
$1,500), 1,350 comp.

1.1 to 1

Affirmed

DeVas v.
Noble

$750 p.d.
$200 comp.

3.7 to 1

Affirmed

Nance v.
Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l
Assoc.

No damages (trial
court award $1
nominal damages,
$14,000 in
attorneys' fees,
and $40,000 p.d.

Holland v.
Moreton

$25,000 p.d.
$95,833 comp.

,26 to 1

Affirmed

Ostertag
v. LaMont

$2,000 p.d. (trial
court remitted to
$860) , $140 comp..

6.14 to 1

Affirmed

Sadlier v.
Knapton

$2,000 p.d.
$8,000 comp.

.25 to 1

Affirmed

Wilson v.
Oldroyd

$25,000 p.d.
$50,000 comp.

1 to 2

Reduced punitive
award t o $5,000

40,000 to 1

14

Reversed and
reinstated
jury's finding
of no damages

Jury Award
(p.d. = punitive
damages,
comp. = compensatory
damages)

Case
Evans v.
Gaisford

Ratio Punitive
Damages to
Compensatory
Damages

$1,499.95 p.d.
$1,000 comp. (trial
court remitted
p.d. to $1,000 and
comp. to $900)

Appellate
Action Taken
on Punitive
Damage Award

1.1 to 1

Affirmed

At the present time, the $4.0 million punitive award bears
more than a 4.9 to 1 relationship to the compensatory award, which
this

Court

has

already

recognized

was

Crookston, 817 P. 2d at 806-807, fn. 22.

"admittedly

liberal."

Plaintiffs and even the

trial court on remand have sought to recompute and recharacterize
the "actual damages" in this case in order to bring the punitive
award within the presumptive ratio.

Such attempts have, however,

failed.
With the exception of Ostertacr v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339
P. 2d 1022 (1959) (Upholding punitives of $860 to actual damages of
$140) and DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d
(Upholding

punitives

of

$750

to

actual

damages

290

of

(1962)

$200),

no

reported decision listed by this Court in Crookston has sustained
a jury verdict with a ratio greater than the presumptive ratios
enunciated in Crookston.

The punitive damage award in this case

stands out in stark defiance of this Court's prior pronouncements
that

punitive

relationship

damages
to

actual

should

bear

damages

a

reasonable

sustained.

and

Absent

rational
such

a

relationship, this Court in the past has been required to label
such deviant verdicts as "grossly disproportionate" and "the result
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of passion and prejudice.ff

The trial court's refusal to remit the

punitive damage award or to grant a new trial in this case was an
abuse of discretion because such damages do not bear a reasonable
and rational relationship to the. compensatory damages in this case,
c

-

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing
Distinguish Between "Hard11 Damages and "Soft" Damages

to

The instant case presents an even more compelling case for
this Court to modify the punitive damage award because of the
significant amount of "soft11 damages already awarded to plaintiffs.
While a trial court may not be bound to reduce a punitive damage
award merely because it exceeds the presumptive ratios set forth in
Crookston,

a

reviewing

court

should

carefully

examine

the

distinction between "hard11 and "soft" actual damages in determining
the appropriateness of a punitive damage award.

Crookston, 817

P. 2d at 811, fn. 29. Where actual damages are largely "soft," this
Court should be reluctant to uphold punitive awards "that might
survive scrutiny if the actual damages involved were 'hard.'"

Id.

In this case, plaintiffs' compensatory damages of $815,826 were
approximately 60% "soft" and 40% "hard."

The punitive award in

this case bears an approximately 12.4 to 1 relationship to the hard
damages.

The trial court's refusal to remit the punitive damage

award in this case, even where the "less than 3 to 1" ratio is
suspect, is compelling evidence that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Fire Insurance's motion for new trial or
remittitur.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON FACTS
AND UNREASONABLE INFERENCES OUTSIDE THE RECORD
IN SUPPORT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS OF
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE.
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court's ruling on defendant's
motion

for

new

trial

or

remittitur

and

the

jury's

initial

unprecedented punitive damage award were reasonable because of the
need

to

punish

defendant.2

defendant

and

to

deter

further

misconduct

by

Plaintiffs assert that defendant can only be punished

by a large monetary award.

Likewise, plaintiffs assert that future

misconduct on the part of defendant cannot be deterred until and
unless the jury's original $4.0 million punitive award is affirmed.
In order to arrive at these assertions, plaintiffs invited the
trial court to engage in groundless speculation and conjecture
about

defendant's

propensity

to

engage

in

future

misconduct,

defendant's attitude towards this litigation, defendant's attitude
towards

its

employees

who

made

mistakes

in

the

handling

of

plaintiffs' claim, and a whole host of other factors.
Plaintiffs baldly assert that defendant, because of the nature
of its business, has the opportunity to engage in further similar
misconduct.

The record is clear that one of the complicating

factors in this case was the uniqueness of the loss.

All the

parties, including plaintiffs, experienced difficulty in obtaining

"'Plaintiffs' analysis of the traditional "list of factors" standards as
further supporting the present punitive award is addressed in Fire Insurance's
initial brief, pp. 11-24.
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competent and complete repair bids on the destroyed structure.

The

uniqueness of the circumstances presented in this case suggests the
unlikelihood of similar misconduct in the future.

While defendant

continues to handle numerous claims throughout Utah and the United
States, there was no evidence presented to the jury to suggest that
the mistakes of the defendant's employees were part of any pattern
of fraud or other wrongdoing.

The uniqueness of the circumstances

presented in this case militates in favor of a remittitur.

See

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984).
Plaintiffs also assert that a large award is required in order
to

deter

further

misconduct

because

defendant

has

built-in

financial incentives to cheat and chisel its insureds on claims.
No such evidence was presented at trial.

Common sense and reason

suggests

business,

that

in

a highly

competitive

there

is

no

reasonable incentive to engage in conduct similar to that for which
defendant is now being punished.
chisel

one's

own

insureds

is

The disincentive to cheat or
demonstrated

underpayment has now been parlayed

that

a

$21,612

into a multi-million dollar

judgment against defendant.
Plaintiffs

continue

to

assert

that

defendant

should

be

punished because there has been "no indication of contrition or
remorse11 on the part of defendant and its employees.
point

to

the

promotion

of

the

claims

adjusters

Plaintiffs
who

handled

plaintiffs7 claims and defendant's alleged failure to "voluntarily
take

any

action

to

rectify

the

wrongs"

or

"reprimand

the

perpetrators" as evidence of a calculated and calloused attitude
18

which

merits

severe

punishment

by

this

court.

Plaintiffs

successfully urged the trial court to assume that the promotions of
defendant's employees were attempts to "applaud" the misconduct and
the result of those employees' "record of improving profits for
Fire Insurance."

(R. 3204)

Plaintiffs also successfully urged the

trial court to assume that "to this day [defendant] has failed or
refused to recognize the wrong it has wrought upon the plaintiffs."
(R. 3218)

The record, however, on each of these "facts" is silent.

Likewise, even if these "facts" are viewed as merely inferences
drawn

by Judge

Frederick

from

the

facts

in the

record,

such

inferences were unreasonable.
The trial court's nearly verbatim adoption of plaintiffs'
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for new trial or
remittitur into the court's order resulted in the trial court's
order being based upon facts and inferences wholly without record
support.

(See R. 3094-3177, 3197-3219, 3238-3243)

In such cases,

the trial court's reliance on such facts provides a separate ground
for reversal.

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805, n. 19.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, defendant Fire Insurance Exchange
respectfully requests that this Court either grant defendant a new
trial on the issue of punitive damages utilizing the Crookston
standards

or

that

this

Court

order

a

remittitur

unprecedented award of punitive damages in this case.
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